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 270 in France, over 100 in Germany and Austria-Hungary, and 23 in sleepy Portugal.
 The high percentage of foreign recipients of patents, which declined only slightly
 from 83 to 77 percent between 1897 and 1904, confirmed the predominance of foreign
 expertise and technology in the most dynamic sectors of the Russian economy at the
 turn of the century.
 The nightmare of subjugation by foreign technology, reflected in the high per-
 centage of Europeans, especially Germans, who received Russian patents, inspired not
 only the traditionally xenophobic Moscow merchants but also high officials of the
 Ministry of Finance, notably A. N. Gur'ev, to demand rigid bureaucratic controls on
 foreigners seeking patents: "The government was ... expected to find a solution which
 would on the one hand encourage Russian invention activity and stimulate the interest
 of entrepreneurs in improving their production technology [and] on the other hand
 prevent foreign investors from monopolizing the technology which was important for
 the development of Russian industry" (138). Tsarism never resolved this dilemma.
 To be sure, all governments found it difficult to promulgate patent laws capable
 of protecting inventors' rights to a fair reward while encouraging the diffusion of
 innovative technology. Unfortunately, the tsarist bureaucracy failed both to accom-
 modate the dynamism of foreign capitalism and to stimulate the weak entrepreneurial
 impulses of Russian merchants.
 Rejecting the notion that the Russian state overcame structural obstacles to eco-
 nomic development, Aer reiterates the findings of recent historiography, which has
 stressed the high costs of bureaucratic repression. Jealous of its autocratic power, the
 bureaucracy viewed the granting of an invention privilege "as a special and exclusive
 right, an exception to the normal law" (182) rather than a right to be enjoyed by
 inventors under a system of private property. Bureaucratic arbitrariness led to delays
 of three to five years in decisions to grant patents to inventors; errors in judging the
 novelty of inventions, entailing further delays and financial losses; the refusal to create
 an independent patent office or to join the Paris Convention on the treatment of
 foreign patents (1883); and the toleration of such confusion that "even the courts
 could not make sense of the laws" regulating patents (158).
 Aer's treatment of Sergei Witte's economic program of October 1893 is particu-
 larly useful. This document was first published, in English, in the summer 1995 issue
 of Russian Studies in History in an abridgment annotated by Leonid E. Shepelev of St.
 Petersburg, who noted the importance of the document in his book on tsarist eco-
 nomic policy some fifteen years ago. Her analysis of the archival document has the
 added advantage of discussing Witte's recommendations for patent law reform, which
 did not appear in Shepelev's abridged version.
 Finally, this study has considerable relevance for an understanding of Russia's
 current economic crisis. Lest nostalgic Russians consider Stalin's firm hand a solution
 to economic backwardness, Aer points out in her last footnote that the Soviet govern-
 ment granted a paltry total of 424 patents from 1932 to 1975, less than one-quarter
 of the number approved in imperial Russia in 1900 alone (184).
 THOMAS C. OWEN
 Louisiana State University
 Russian Rightists and the Revolution of 1905. By Don C. Rawson. Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press, 1995. xvi, 283 pp. Index. Plates. Tables. Hard bound. Paper.
 In this lucidly written and cogently argued book, Don Rawson examines the formation
 of right-wing political parties during the revolutionary crisis of 1905. He explores the
 ideologies, platforms, and activities of the maze of monarchist political parties, group-
 ings, and organizations and argues that the defenders of the old order enjoyed no
 small degree of public support in certain regions of the empire, which in turn en-
 couraged the autocracy to reassert its authority by 1907. Faced with Tsar Nicholas II's
 concession of the Duma, the monarchists-no friends of a legislative assembly that
 limited the prerogatives of autocratic power- realized they had no choice but to or-
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 ganize politically and join the fray of electoral politics in order to stem the tide of
 constitutionalism. Rawson believes that the rightists understood all too well the polit-
 ical impasse created by a regime trying to depict the tsar as a "constitutional autocrat"
 and therefore paradoxically immersed themselves in electoral politics in order to
 preserve the old order.
 Rawson identifies two strains of right-wing politics. The extremists, known best
 through the Union of Russian People led by A. I. Dubrovin and V. M. Purishkevich,
 virulently denounced the liberal and radical opposition, gave voice to their Russian
 chauvinism and anti-Semitic sentiments, and worked to destroy the Duma from within.
 Seeking to restore the unfettered autocracy, the extremists tried to inflame popular
 passions against the forces of reform and revolution and did not shy away from ex-
 tralegal activities such as inciting pogroms and assassinating prominent liberal poli-
 ticians. The moderate right-wingers, concentrated in the Slavophilic Union of Russian
 Men, shared many of the same views and values of the extremists but rejected the
 rabble-rousing and obstructionist techniques and strategies of their compatriots to the
 right. Instead, they reluctantly accepted the political changes that had already taken
 place and worked to prevent further reform. Though the moderates often joined forces
 with the extremists on some issues, they were more often than not willing to form
 alliances with the Octobrists, thereby expressing their willingness to work within the
 confines of the new political structures.
 Whereas previous studies of the right-wing parties have focused primarily on their
 activities in the two capital cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, Rawson's work ex-
 plores their fortunes throughout the empire. He finds that the right-wing agenda
 struck a responsive chord in the western borderlands and central agricultural prov-
 inces, two regions where issues of nationality and religion and law and order, respec-
 tively, dominated politics and elections to the first three Dumas. The rightists played
 to the fears of rural and urban property owners in the case of the agricultural regions
 wracked by peasant rebellion, and of Russian nationalists in the ethnically diverse
 western borderlands where anti-Polish and anti-Jewish sentiments ran high. Most right-
 wing parties understood the importance of mobilizing popular support for the Duma
 campaigns and accordingly devoted time and energy to political networking and build-
 ing local organizations. Overall, the rightists managed to claim only 10 percent of the
 seats in the second Duma, but they did gain pluralities and sometimes majorities in
 the second Duma elections in some regions of the central agricultural provinces and
 the western borderlands. The Stolypin electoral coup d'etat of June 1907 enabled the
 moderate rightists to fare even better in the elections to the third Duma. In alliance
 with Octobrist deputies, they formed a Duma majority that engaged in partisan politics
 designed to preserve the political and social status quo. After the reassertion of au-
 tocratic power by mid-1907 and the formation of a Duma loyal to the crown, the
 rightists, as Rawson writes, "no longer felt as much need to contend against liberal
 constitutionalism or revolutionary violence, both of which had seemingly been con-
 tained" and "faded from prominence" (230-31).
 Rawson deserves credit for depictihg the shadings of the right-wing movement
 and putting to rest the myth that the tsarist government actively supported the par-
 amilitary actions of the extreme right. Though the government and the right-wing
 shared a commitment to the preservation of the autocracy, the tsar's ministers were
 careful in the forms of assistance given to the most loyal supporters of the regime.
 Tsar Nicholas and his closest advisers not only feared that the extralegal activities of
 the extreme right might add to the turmoil enveloping Russia in 1905-06, but they
 also distrusted the initiative and independence displayed by the regime's staunchest
 supporters. Thus, the Ministry of Internal Affairs monitored and at times curtailed
 the activities of the Union of the Russian People and other extremist organizations.
 In sum, Rawson illuminates an important chapter of the waning years of the
 Romanov dynasty and offers insights into the political challenges confronting Russian
 society at the turn of the twentieth century.
 ROBERrT WEINBERG
 Swarthmore College
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